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The Case of Mozambique
With the impending 2009 Ottawa Convention1 deadline quickly approaching, it has become clear 
that Mozambique will not be able to complete their required obligations without an extension. 
Dwindling funding, inadequate resources and the challenge of other internal problems have 
delayed the mine-action progress, but what will be the solution?
by Maria Isabel Macedo dos santos [ Instituto Nacional de Desminagem Mozambique ]
Demining work in progress in Mafambisse, sofala province, Mozambique.
pHoTo CouRTesy of THe AuTHoR
signal to states with deadlines in the coming years on how their 
own cases will be handled. The precedent set at the 9MSP would 
either discourage states from presenting unjustified extension 
requests or it would let them know that “anything goes.” 
The views put forward by the Analyzing Group were criti-
cally important because they provided the basis on which other 
states took their decisions at the 9MSP. Despite the importance 
of their role, a small number of states in the Analyzing Group 
encouraged a passive and uncritical role for the group, report-
edly politicizing and personalizing the workings of the group. 
They also fought hard to keep the group’s work closed and se-
cretive, which is highly unusual for the work of the Ottawa 
Convention, born out of a close collaboration between states 
and nongovernmental partners. Despite these constraints, the 
group managed to produce several final analyses with useful 
constructive criticism. But the analyses clearly applied different 
standards to different states, showing the regional bias of some 
Analyzing Group members. Perhaps the most positive outcome 
of the group’s work was the proactive engagement with the re-
questing states  that in some cases led to new requests reflecting 
improved planning.
The 9MSP and the End Game
After the analyses were given to  the other States Parties, it 
was their turn to reflect on and guide the outcome at the 9MSP. 
The treaty says that the MSP, or Review Conference, shall “as-
sess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States 
Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for 
an extension period.”1 The question was therefore how states 
would react to those requests that did not merit approval as 
presented. As noted above, the first action was for the Analyz-
ing Group to try to get certain countries to amend the requests, 
including the amount of time requested. This approach was the 
most logical and diplomatic way of dealing with the problem, 
and it worked in a few cases. States did, of course, have the op-
tion to turn down the request, but that would mean that the 
country would be in violation of the treaty when its deadline 
passes, and therefore, States Parties were reluctant to consider 
this possibility. 
 The solution proposed by the President of the 9MSP, Am-
bassador Jurg Streuli of Switzerland, was for states to grant all 
requests as drafted, but with comments from States Parties that 
in certain cases encouraged the country to complete the demin-
ing work faster than planned and/or to clarify other outstand-
ing issues of concern in the requests. 
This approach was satisfactory for most cases, but the ICBL 
was still calling for States Parties to turn down requests from 
any state that had no plans to begin demining operations before 
its original 10-year deadline, namely the United Kingdom and 
Venezuela. States Parties chose to focus their criticism on the 
United Kingdom, which, unlike Venezuela, presented a request 
for the maximum 10 years with no timeline or budget for begin-
ning, let alone finishing, its demining duties. In essence, they 
were asking for carte blanche to implement Article 5 if and when 
it liked. States Parties understood that such a request would be 
highly detrimental to the treaty and therefore spoke out publicly 
and privately against it. The United Kingdom tried to calm its 
critics by announcing that it would launch a tender in 2009 to 
begin demining three of its 117 mined areas and by arguing that 
a feasibility study with a range of vague demining options actu-
ally constituted a concrete plan. 
In the end, States Parties’ dissatisfaction with these small 
steps coupled with their continued concern about the impli-
cations of a “no” vote for the treaty led to a compromise out-
come. The United Kingdom’s request, along with the other 14 
requesting parties, was approved without a vote, and each was 
accompanied by comments in the form of an MSP decision. In 
the United Kingdom’s language, it agreed to return to States 
Parties within 1.5 years with more details about its work plan, 
to provide regular progress reports, and to consider on an an-
nual basis if it would be possible to reduce the time necessary 
to finish its demining duties. States Parties also encouraged 
the United Kingdom—along with Ecuador, Peru and Senegal—
to finish demining more quickly than initially planned. The 
decision for Venezuela was the weakest, commenting simply 
that it “may find itself in a situation wherein it could complete 
implementation before October 2014 and that this could ben-
efit the Convention.” Other useful comments in the analyses 
did not make it into the final decisions because the concerned 
states were given the chance to approve the decision language.   
Conclusion
Despite some shortcomings, the first extension request 
decision process produced a solid foundation on which the 
future implementation of Article 5 can rest. States Parties that 
asked for more time to demine were challenged to show that 
they were truly seeking the minimum time necessary to com-
plete the work. The process could still use improvement—to 
prevent regional discrepancies in the treatment of requests 
for example—but overall States Parties confirmed that there 
will be no rubber-stamping of requests and made it clear that 
the duty to demine “as soon as possible” also applies to the 
extension period. 
See Endnotes, page 112
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Adecade has passed since the signing of the Ottawa Con-vention and the commitment of the States Parties to work toward eradicating landmines in all affected coun-
tries. In this period, significant progress on landmine clearance 
and victim assistance has been registered, and significant areas 
have been cleared and released to the communities. 
The Progress
Mozambique signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention, be-
coming a State Party in March 1999. In May 1999, Mozambique 
hosted the First Meeting of States Parties in its capital, Maputo. 
In compliance with Ottawa Convention Article 4, Mozambique 
destroyed its anti-personnel landmine stockpiles in February 
2003 and has been conducting clearance activities to meet the 
March 2009 deadline.
Like many affected countries, Mozambique has endured war 
and destabilization for more than 30 years, leaving landmines 
and unexploded ordnance spread all over the country. In 1992 
when the government and the then-rebel movement Resistência 
Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO) signed a peace agreement 
in Rome, the United Nations dispatched its peacekeeping mis-
sion, and one of its mandates included demining operations. 
Mozambique has been demining its countryside since then.
The Problem
Mozambique faces many other challenges, including poverty, 
natural disasters and endemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The 
majority of its population is rural and, consequently, the pres-
ence of landmines and other UXO constitutes a major impedi-
ment to the economic and social development of affected areas.
Fifteen years of demining activities have elapsed, surveys 
have been conducted and thousands of square meters of land 
have been released to the people. A recent baseline assessment, 
carried out by The HALO Trust in the remaining affected areas, 
has shown that there is work to be done to comply with Article 
52 of the Ottawa Convention. The 2009 Convention deadline is 
approaching, and the landmine problem is far from solved. Out 
of the 36 States Parties with deadlines for 2009 and 2010, only 10 
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vey informed the five-year strategic plan (2008–2012) written to 
guide the implementation of mine-action activities during the 
extension. According to Mozambique’s projections, on average, 
an estimated US$5.9 million is needed every year for more than 
six years in order to meet the Convention obligations.9
Efforts undertaken to release cleared land to communities 
have had positive socioeconomic consequences. Communities 
and their inhabitants are the ultimate beneficiaries of land re-
lease. In areas still considered affected, the presence of land-
mines and UXO has a major negative impact on communities. 
Completing mine clearance would clearly benefit the commu-
nities by allowing the citizens to work on their land, and would 
therefore contribute toward the reduction of poverty.
It is time to look into the problems that most States Parties 
have encountered along the 10 years of the treaty’s existence. 
Collective analysis of each state’s challenges and shortcomings 
will help provide appropriate data to support reaching the goals 
the Convention was ultimately set to achieve. For countries like 
Mozambique, the extension must be granted and coordinated, 
and donor support should follow to enable the implementation 
of the national strategic program. 
States bear the primary responsibility in designing and im-
plementing strategies, plans and programs for mine action with-
in their borders. However, many States Parties like Mozambique 
are still in need of assistance. The United Nations Development 
Programme, other international organizations, nongovern-
mental organizations and governments able to do so should play 
a vital role by mainstreaming mine action into their activities 
in mine-affected countries. In addition, local capacity building 
should be at the center of every effort to ensure sustainability of 
mine action in these countries. 
The challenge is great, but there is an equally great oppor-
tunity to attain the goals of the Convention through coherent, 
coordinated and collective action.
See Endnotes, page 112
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have completed clearance obligations—12 may meet the obliga-
tion, and at least 14 will request an extension to meet it. Mozambique 
is included in the list of those needing an extension.3
Mozambique has made earnest efforts to support mine-
action activities—demining has been integrated into govern-
ment plans to reduce poverty as a cross-cutting priority. This 
measure clearly shows its commitment to demining and to the 
Ottawa Convention.
The challenge remains: With a myriad of priority areas to 
be funded, resources are limited. Clearance itself relies heavily 
on industrialized world technology and funding. Paradoxically, 
it costs as little as US$3 to produce a landmine yet as much as 
$1,000 to remove it once it has been emplanted.4 Mozambique 
has benefited from financial and technical support from the do-
nor community; however, due to the country’s low level of eco-
nomic development, Mozambique’s needs always exceed the 
resources available. 
It is vital to mention that the Convention has played a very 
important role in limiting the proliferation of anti-personnel 
mines; however, actual mine clearance is an essential compo-
nent of the solution to the global problem.5
Contrary to what was expected, the f low of funds from 
donors for clearance activities has declined year after year. In 
the case of Mozambique, different international nongovern-
mental organizations have left the country or are in the process 
of phasing out their activities. This situation is of great concern 
because landmine-affected States Parties are faced with insuffi-
cient funding to continue demining activities and, thereby, ful-
fill their Ottawa Convention deadlines.
What is the Next Step?
Article 6 of the Ottawa Convention states that each State 
Party has the right to seek and receive assistance for the fulfill-
ment of its Convention obligations and to request assistance in 
the implementation of its national mine-action plan.6 States also 
have the responsibility to make an effort to meet the Conven-
tion deadlines. Although the government of Mozambique has 
been increasing its funding to mine action, mine clearance has 
proven costly, and external funding is crucial for Mozambique 
to reach its final goal. 
It is clear that the failure to meet the deadline means that 
Mozambique, and many other countries, will need more re-
sources. Mine action must compete for the same resources as 
other problems, namely poverty, endemic diseases, and the ef-
fects of high oil and food prices. This battle of priorities puts im-
mense pressure on donors and States Parties, and mine action is 
likely to lose the tug of war for funding.
As Olivier Vodoz, then-President of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, mentioned on his statement to the 8th 
Meeting of the States Parties7 in Jordan in 2007, “Every day 
during which the Convention‘s deadline is not met is a day in 
which civilians are put at risk. The Mine Ban Convention will be 
judged on the basis of States Parties’ capacity to manage clear-
ance deadlines in a way which maintains the credibility of the 
Convention and creates maximum pressure for completion be-
fore the deadline or within a realistic well-planned and ade-
quately funded extension period.”8
At this juncture, it is necessary to look at different countries, 
their level of contamination, and the resources available to assist 
them in safely and cheaply clearing their lands of these deadly 
weapons. Mozambique benefited from the recent baseline as-
sessment conducted by The HALO Trust. The results of the sur-
The first demining machine is believed to have been de-veloped by Major Abraham du Toit, a South African soldier and engineer. In early 1942, he was sent to 
England to refine a demining machine prototype he had 
constructed in South Africa. 
Before leaving for England, du Toit discussed his ideas 
with Captain Norman Berry, a British mechanical engi-
neer. Berry conducted his own unofficial experiments with 
flails in Libya before providing the results to another Brit-
ish officer at an army workshop in Egypt. This collabora-
tion resulted in the development of the Matilda Scorpion, 
a Matilda tank fitted with a rotor mounted on two arms 
at the front. The rotor carried 24 flails and was driven at 
100 revolutions per minute by a 105-horsepower Ford V8 
engine. A second engine was fitted with an armored box 
mounted on the right side of the tank. This box included 
space for a crew member, who operated the flail. 
A number of these vehicles were produced and became 
operational in October 1942 when they were used in the 
Second Battle of El Alamein (23 October to 5 November 
1942). Although the clearance speed was slow, the Scorpion 
operators were able to conceal the machines from German 
soldiers because of the huge dust cloud they formed; how-
ever, the dust cloud also blinded and affected the breath-
ing of the drivers, so crews had to wear gas masks in order 
to breathe. 
The first flails were not as successful as expected. They 
were unreliable, with frequent breakdowns. Problems were 
also encountered with the heat and dust, a problem encoun-
tered with flails today. The first Matilda Scorpion was fol-
lowed by several similar machines such as the Mark II, III, 
IV and V versions of the Scorpion. Version V was mounted 
on the Sherman tank. 
Other flails that followed included the Matilda Baron 
and the Sherman Crab. The Crab ran on the tank’s main 
engine, had 43 flail hammers and included a rotor for 
cutting barbed wire to prevent the flail from getting en-
tangled. The flail also had a mechanism to ensure that it 
followed ground contours and had extra protection in the 
form of a blast shield. This flail did not clear all mines and 
Mechanical Demining: From 1942 
to the Present
by pehr Lodhammar 
[ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
Although demining machines have been in existence since 1942, they were not used in 
the field of mine action until about the early 1990s. Demining machines were initially only 
used by the military. With the growing number of casualties stemming from landmines, 
especially among civilians, it became necessary to employ machines for humanitarian 
purposes. From the first demining machine constructed in early 1942 to the present, 
tremendous improvements have been made. 
could only move at very low speeds; however, the Crab was 
used during and after the D-Day landings and allowed the 
Allied Forces to advance through the German minefields.
Up to the end of the 1980s, demining machines were 
only used by the military. In the early 1990s, however, the 
need for demining machines for humanitarian purposes 
was recognized, and the machines were introduced into 
countries such as Afghanistan and Angola. Initially, mil-
itary carriers were used, but later purpose-built carriers 
were developed.1 Early machines were often clumsy, unre-
liable and underpowered. The clearance results also fell be-
low the minimum United Nations’ requirement.
The revolving drum and chains on a Matilda scorpion flail tank. 17 April 1942.
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